Katalog GES



Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality

1st Person: Güth, Werner
Additional Persons: Kliemt, Hartmut; Koukoumelis, Anastasios; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo
Type of Publication: Paper
Language: English
Published: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) 2013
Series: CESifo Working Paper
Online: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/89776/1/cesifo_wp4541.pdf
id
oai_econstor.eu_10419-89776
recordtype
econstor
institution
MPG
collection
ECONSTOR
title
Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality
spellingShingle
Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality
Güth, Werner
CESifo Working Paper
title_short
Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality
title_full
Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality
title_fullStr
Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality
title_full_unstemmed
Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality
title_sort
Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality
format
electronic Article
format_phy_str_mv
Paper
publisher
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
publishDate
2013
language
English
author
Güth, Werner
author2
Kliemt, Hartmut
Koukoumelis, Anastasios
Levati, M. Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
author2Str
Kliemt, Hartmut
Koukoumelis, Anastasios
Levati, M. Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
description
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the mechanism is conducive to efficiency, despite the multiplicity of equilibria and underbidding incentives. The only condition is that the cost of the most efficient project must be positive.
url
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/89776/1/cesifo_wp4541.pdf
series
CESifo Working Paper
seriesStr
CESifo Working Paper
CESifo Working Paper
series2
CESifo Working Paper
series2_facet
CESifo Working Paper
up_date
2019-05-25T02:50:23.338Z
_version_
1634470595068428290

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