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Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?

1st Person: Soubeyran, Raphaël
Type of Publication: Paper
Language: English
Published: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 2006
Series: Nota di Lavoro
Keywords: Public Choice
Wahl
Radikalismus
Öffentliches Gut
Theorie
Public choice
Election
Radicalism
Theory
Online: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/74191/1/NDL2006-084.pdf
id
oai_econstor.eu_10419-74191
recordtype
econstor
institution
MPG
collection
ECONSTOR
title
Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?
spellingShingle
Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?
Public Choice
Wahl
Radikalismus
Öffentliches Gut
Theorie
Public choice
Election
Radicalism
Theory
Soubeyran, Raphaël
Nota di Lavoro
title_short
Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?
title_full
Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?
title_fullStr
Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?
title_full_unstemmed
Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?
title_sort
Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?
format
electronic Article
format_phy_str_mv
Paper
publisher
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
publishDate
2006
language
English
topic
Public Choice
Wahl
Radikalismus
Öffentliches Gut
Theorie
Public choice
Election
Radicalism
Theory
topic_facet
Public choice
Election
Radicalism
Theory
author
Soubeyran, Raphaël
description
Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? If the answer to these questions were positive, as suggested in recent work (Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Aragones and Palfrey (2002), Groseclose (1999), and Aragones and Palfrey (2003)), this would mean that extremist candidates are bad politicians. We consider a two candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two dimensional policy space and two dimensions of candidates heterogeneity. In this setting, we show that the conclusion depends on candidates relative competences over the two public goods and distinguish between two types of advantages (an absolute advantage and comparative advantage in providing the two public goods).
url
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/74191/1/NDL2006-084.pdf
series
Nota di Lavoro
seriesStr
Nota di Lavoro
Nota di Lavoro
series2
Nota di Lavoro
series2_facet
Nota di Lavoro
up_date
2019-02-15T03:50:14.482Z
_version_
1625505272729436161

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