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The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments

1st Person: Demuynck, Thomas
Additional Persons: Herings, Jean-Jacques; Saulle, Riccardo D.; Seel, Christian
Type of Publication: Paper
Language: English
Published: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 2017
Series: Nota di Lavoro
Online: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162268
id
oai_econstor.eu_10419-162268
recordtype
econstor
institution
MPG
collection
ECONSTOR
title
The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
spellingShingle
The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
Demuynck, Thomas
Nota di Lavoro
title_short
The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
title_full
The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
title_fullStr
The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
title_full_unstemmed
The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
title_sort
The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
format
electronic Article
format_phy_str_mv
Paper
publisher
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
publishDate
2017
language
English
author
Demuynck, Thomas
author2
Herings, Jean-Jacques
Saulle, Riccardo D.
Seel, Christian
author2Str
Herings, Jean-Jacques
Saulle, Riccardo D.
Seel, Christian
description
We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set. The myopic stable set is defined for a very general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. We show that the myopic stable set exists and is non-empty. Under minor continuity conditions, we also demonstrate uniqueness. Furthermore, the myopic stable set is a superset of the core and of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. Additionally, the myopic stable set generalizes and unifies various results from more specific environments. In particular, the myopic stable set coincides with the coalition structure core in coalition function form games if the coalition structure core is non-empty; with the set of stable matchings in the standard one-to-one matching model; with the set of pairwise stable networks and closed cycles in models of network formation; and with the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite supermodular games, finite potential games, and aggregative games. We illustrate the versatility of our concept by characterizing the myopic stable set in a model of Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs, for which the literature so far has not been able to fully characterize the set of all (mixed) Nash equilibria.
url
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162268
series
Nota di Lavoro
seriesStr
Nota di Lavoro
Nota di Lavoro
series2
Nota di Lavoro
series2_facet
Nota di Lavoro
up_date
2019-04-19T02:50:14.781Z
_version_
1631209095251886083

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