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International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy

1st Person: Carraro, Carlo
Additional Persons: Siniscalco, Domenico
Type of Publication: Paper
Language: English
Published: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 1997
Series: Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
id
oai_econstor.eu_10419-154858
recordtype
econstor
institution
MPG
collection
ECONSTOR
title
International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy
spellingShingle
International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy
Carraro, Carlo
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
title_short
International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy
title_full
International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy
title_fullStr
International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy
title_full_unstemmed
International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy
title_sort
International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy
format
electronic Article
format_phy_str_mv
Paper
publisher
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
publishDate
1997
language
English
author
Carraro, Carlo
author2
Siniscalco, Domenico
author2Str
Siniscalco, Domenico
description
International environmental agreements are increasingly important in a globalised economy. Beyond their specific interest, these agreements are also important in the context of coalition formation theory. Given the incentives to free ride, associated to the environment as a public good and to the presence of spillovers, the profitability and the optimality of environmental agreements are separated from their stability (i.e. self-enforcement): hence, a whole set of political economy issues. This paper reviews the recent advances in this area. In particular it discusses mechanisms and strategies aimed at offsetting the incentives to free ride and increasing welfare, such as transfers, issue linkages, threats and multiple agreements. The main results show that partial coalitions and multiple agreements tend to prevail among subsets of players, and that agreements among all players are most unlikely to exist. The design of the agreements, moreover, can be crucial in determining the number of signatory countries.
series
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
seriesStr
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
series2
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
series2_facet
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
up_date
2018-11-14T03:50:14.700Z
_version_
1617079766703144962

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