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The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform

A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of organized... Full description

1st Person: Cioffi, John W.
Additional Persons: Höpner, Martin
Source: in: Politics & Society (2006), Vol. 34 (4), p. 463-502
Type of Publication: Article
Published: 2006
Keywords: corporate governance > finance capitalism > center-left parties > economic reform > financial regulation
Online: Full text via publisher
Abstract
Full text via publisher
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100 1 |a Cioffi, John W.  |u Projekte von Gastwissenschaftlern und Postdoc-Stipendiaten, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society; University of California, Riverside  |0 (eterms:CONE)/persons/resource/persons41150  |4 aut 
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520 3 |a A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of organized capitalism, concentrated corporate stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy, and the United States reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves as pro-growth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and appeal to middle-class voters. Conservative parties’ established alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate governance reform. 
533 |n [Online] 
653 0 0 |a corporate governance  |a finance capitalism  |a center-left parties  |a economic reform  |a financial regulation 
700 1 |a Höpner, Martin  |u Institutioneller Wandel im gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society  |0 (eterms:CONE)/persons/resource/persons41207  |4 aut 
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