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Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions

We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults are costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutions allow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign... Full description

1st Person: GENNAIOLI, NICOLA
Additional Persons: MARTIN, ALBERTO verfasserin; ROSSI, STEFANO verfasserin
Source: in The journal of finance : the journal of the American Finance Association Vol. 69, No. 2 (2014), p. 819-866
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Type of Publication: Article
Language: English
Published: 2014
Keywords: research-article
Online: Volltext
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