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International Institutions and Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions have long occupied the attention of both scholars and policymakers. Despite the widespread use of sanctions, many observers have concluded that the inherent problems associated with imposing sanctions involving multiple senders substantially limit their effectiveness. This... Full description

1st Person: Mansfield, Edward D.
Additional Persons: Martin, Lisa L. rezensierte person; Mastanduno, Michael rezensierte person
Source: in World Politics Vol. 47, No. 4 (1995), p. 575-605
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Type of Publication: Article
Language: English
Published: 1995
Online: Volltext
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245 1 0 |a International Institutions and Economic Sanctions  |h Elektronische Ressource 
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500 |a Copyright: Copyright 1995 Johns Hopkins University Press 
510 3 |a Martin, Lisa L.: Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions  |c Mansfield, Edward D. 
520 |a Economic sanctions have long occupied the attention of both scholars and policymakers. Despite the widespread use of sanctions, many observers have concluded that the inherent problems associated with imposing sanctions involving multiple senders substantially limit their effectiveness. This article reviews two books that analyze the factors that influence cooperation among senders of multilateral sanctions. These books indicate that international institutions can do much to promote cooperation of this sort. However, this essay argues that the extent to which international institutions facilitate cooperation among senders of sanctions is likely to depend on the domestic politics of members, the type of institution being used for this purpose, the nature of the strategy being pursued, and the distribution of power among members. Although these books make significant contributions to our understanding of the factors that promote cooperation among senders of multilateral sanctions, they examine the factors that promote the effectiveness of sanctions in only a peripheral manner. One potential influence on the effectiveness of sanctions that are organized by an international institution, however, is the likelihood that the institution will be captured by member states or by interest groups within them. Additional research that investigates the conditions under which international institutions are likely to be captured and the implications of institutional capture for their performance may therefore prove useful to scholars of international relations and economic statecraft. 
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773 0 8 |i in  |t World Politics  |g Vol. 47, No. 4 (1995), p. 575-605  |q 47:4<575-605  |w (DE-601)JST089616642  |x 1086-3338 
787 0 8 |i Rezension von  |t Martin, Lisa L.: Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions 
787 0 8 |i Rezension von  |t Mastanduno, Michael: Economic Containment: COCOM and the Politics of East-West Trade 
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952 |d 47  |j 1995  |e 4  |h 575-605 

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