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Of Stable Marriages and Graphs, and Strategy and Polytopes

This expository paper develops the principal known results (and some new ones) on the stable matchings of marriage games in the language of directed graphs. This both unifies and simplifies the presentation and renders it more symmetric. In addition, it yields a new algorithm and a new proof for... Full description

1st Person: Balinski, Michel
Additional Persons: Ratier, Guillaume
Source: in SIAM Review Vol. 39, No. 4 (1997), p. 575-604
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Type of Publication: Article
Language: English
Published: 1997
Keywords: marriage problem
stable matching
graph
polytope
game
two-sided market
Online: Volltext
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Summary: This expository paper develops the principal known results (and some new ones) on the stable matchings of marriage games in the language of directed graphs. This both unifies and simplifies the presentation and renders it more symmetric. In addition, it yields a new algorithm and a new proof for the existence of stable matchings, new proofs for many known facts, and some new results (notably concerning players' strategies and the properties of the stable matching polytope).
Item Description: Copyright: Copyright 1997 Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
Physical Description: Online-Ressource
ISSN: 1095-7200

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