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Premium Differentiation in the Unemployment Insurance System and the Demand for Labor

We simulate the effect of the introduction of premium differentiation (experience rating) in the Dutch Unemployment Insurance system on the demand for labor for a variety of sectors in the Dutch economy. For the simulations we use the Bentolila and Bertola (1990) framework as a point of... Full description

1st Person: Alessie, Rob
Additional Persons: Bloemen, Hans verfasserin
Source: in Journal of population economics Vol. 17, No. 4 (2004), p. 729-765
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Type of Publication: Article
Language: English
Published: 2004
Keywords: research-article
J20
J60
J65
J23
J65
Unemployment Insurance
premium differentiation
labor demand
Online: Volltext
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245 1 0 |a Premium Differentiation in the Unemployment Insurance System and the Demand for Labor  |h Elektronische Ressource 
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500 |a Copyright: Copyright 2004 Springer-Verlag 
520 |a We simulate the effect of the introduction of premium differentiation (experience rating) in the Dutch Unemployment Insurance system on the demand for labor for a variety of sectors in the Dutch economy. For the simulations we use the Bentolila and Bertola (1990) framework as a point of departure. In the simulations, the introduction of experience rating is modeled as expenditure neutral: in the absence of premium differentiation the cost of financing UI is modeled as a wage tax (independent of the number of workers fired by the firm), whereas in the presence of experience rating this cost is attributed to firing cost (affected by the firing action). Thus, the introduction of experience rating results in a shift from wage cost to firing cost. Following the political debate on the issue in the Netherlands, we assume that the introduction of experience rating does neither lead to a change in tax rates paid by workers nor to a change in eligibility rules or replacement rates of benefit claimants. Specific attention is paid to the distinction between 'young' and 'old' workers. In the model, labor adjustment costs (hiring and firing costs) are linear. The model allows for uncertainty in the business cycle. 
653 |a research-article 
653 |a J20 
653 |a J60 
653 |a J65 
653 |a J23 
653 |a J65 
653 |a Unemployment Insurance 
653 |a premium differentiation 
653 |a labor demand 
700 1 |a Bloemen, Hans  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
773 0 8 |i in  |t Journal of population economics  |d Berlin : Springer  |g Vol. 17, No. 4 (2004), p. 729-765  |q 17:4<729-765  |w (DE-601)JST051626942  |x 1432-1475 
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